Land distribution, incentives and the choice of production techniques in Nicaragua by Bandiera, Oriana
 
 
 
 
 
Land Distribution, Incentives and the Choice of 
Production Techniques in Nicaragua 
 
 
by 
 
Oriana Bandiera* 
 
London School of Economics and CEPR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Suntory Centre 
Suntory and Toyota International Centres for  
Economics and Related Disciplines 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
DEDPS 34     Tel:  (020) 7955 6674 
April 2002 
 
*  I would like to thank Abhjit Banerjee, Tim Besley, Robin Burgess, Andrea Prat, Imran Rasul, seminar 
participants at Bocconi University, Essex University, LSE, the World Bank and NEUDC2001 for useful 
comments.  Barbara Veronese provided excellent research assistance.  Financial support from STICERD 
and the ESRC (grant no. R000223285) is gratefully acknowledged.  All errors are my own. 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Does the distribution of land rights affect the choice of contractible 
techniques?  I present evidence suggesting that Nicaraguan farmers are 
more likely to grow effort-intensive crops on owned rather than on rented 
plots.  I consider two theoretical arguments that illustrate why property 
rights might matter.  In the first the farmer is subject to limited liability; 
in the second the owner cannot commit to output-contingent contracts.  In 
both cases choices might be inefficient regardless of land distribution.  
The efficiency loss, however, is lower when the farmer owns the land.  
Further evidence suggests that, in this context, the inefficiency derives 
from lack of commitment. 
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1 Introduction
The allocation of property rights can have a strong impact on productivity when, because
of private information, complexity or enforcement problems, market contracts fail to achieve
eﬃciency. Since many agricultural tasks cannot be monitored, contracts in the rural markets of
developing economies are particularly sensitive to these issues. The pattern of land ownership,
which determines whether plots are cultivated by the owner or rented out, is therefore likely to
be an important determinant of agricultural productivity. The empirical evidence on tenancy
contracts (Shaban 1987, Laﬀont and Matoussi 1995, Banerjee Gertler and Ghatak 2001) does
indeed suggest that asymmetric information matters in agriculture and can reduce productivity
considerably. Given that agriculture is the main source of income for most of the world’s
poor, identifying the exact mechanisms through which land distribution aﬀects agricultural
productivity is essential to devise eﬀective policies to reduce poverty and promote growth.
This paper aims to assess whether and how land distribution aﬀects agricultural productiv-
ity through the choice of production techniques. The main purpose is to study how the choice
of contractible techniques, such as irrigation and crop mix, depends on whether the landowner
cultivates his own land. In principle, since techniques are contractible, the landowner should
be able to choose the optimal technique regardless of whom cultivates the land. In practice,
however, the profitability of a given technique might depend on other non-contractible inputs
and hence, through these, on land distribution.
Empirical analysis of the crop choice of Nicaraguan farmers reveals that the distribution
of property rights on land does matter for crop choice. In particular, farmers are more likely
to grow tree crops on the plots they own rather than on the plots they rent. What makes the
result interesting is that growing tree crops, generally in combination with annual crops, is
more profitable but also more eﬀort intensive than growing annual crops alone.
Can asymmetric information provide a consistent explanation for the empirical evidence?
Instinctively, it could be argued that, because of moral hazard, farmers choose less eﬀort and
hence less eﬀort intensive techniques on rented plots. This argument, however, needs to be
qualified. First, since techniques are contractible they can be chosen by the owner of the
land regardless of whether he cultivates it directly. In other words, that tenants face diﬀerent
incentives is of no consequence because ultimately it is the owner of the land who decides
upon production techniques. Second, since farmers who cultivate their own land often need
to borrow to finance cultivation, moral hazard arises regardless of the ownership structure. In
other words, when the farmer is hired to cultivate the land he faces a moral hazard problem
vis-a-vis the landlord; when the farmer owns the land and borrows to finance cultivation he
faces a moral hazard problem vis-a-vis the lender. In fact, an owner-farmer who borrows
against future output might want to exert less than the optimal level of production eﬀort if
doing so reduces the expected value of repayment.
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The paper develops two models in which land distribution determines the choice of non-
contractible eﬀort and contractible production techniques. In line with the empirical evidence,
both models predict that farmers’ownership leads to a more eﬃcient choice of contractible and
non-contractible inputs if these are complements in production. The source of ineﬃciency,
however, diﬀers.
In the first model the farmer is subject to a limited liability constraint and the ineﬃciency
arises because limited liability imposes an upper-bound on the punishment that either the
lender or landlord can inflict on the farmer and makes providing eﬀort incentives costly. The
distribution of property rights determines the farmer’s disagreement payoﬀ ex-ante, hence the
structure of optimal contract and the implied level of incentives, which in turn determine the
choice of eﬀort and production techniques.
In the second model the ineﬃciency arises from the fact that the parties cannot commit to
contracts that are contingent on output. In this context the landowner always has an incentive
to expropriate the other party’s investment, which results in low-powered incentives when
the landlord owns the land and in a credit constraint when the farmer owns the land. Since
ownership entails residual control rights on the asset, in this case the distribution of property
rights determines the farmer’s disagreement payoﬀ ex-post.
Both theories predict that the outcome is closer to first best when the farmer owns the
land and that the ownership structure makes little diﬀerence when farmers are poor. However,
the two models yield a diﬀerent prediction regarding the link between farmers’ wealth and the
choice of techniques. If the ineﬃciency derives from limited liability, farmers’ wealth determines
the cost of providing incentives and therefore aﬀects technique choice both when the farmer
owns and when the farmer rents the land. If the ineﬃciency derives from the inability to
commit, however, farmers’s wealth determines borrowing requirements and therefore aﬀects
technique choice when the farmer owns the land while it is of no consequence when the landlord
owns the land as he is unable to commit with poor and rich tenants alike.
The analysis of crop choice by a sample of Nicaraguan farmers who either own or rent a
plot reveals that wealth is a significant determinant of crop mix only when the farmer owns the
plot. The cross sectional evidence thus suggest that, in this context, the inability to commit
seems to be the main source of ineﬃciency.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the two models
and discusses their empirical implications. Section 3 describes the data-set, discusses the
econometric models, presents the evidence on crop choice and a test between the two models.
Section 4 discusses the related literature. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Theory
2.1 Set-Up.
There are two agents, L and F, and a plot of land. It is assumed that only F can farm the
land, that L is always wealthier than F, and that both agents are risk neutral. Property rights
on land are fully defined and can be assigned either to L or to F.1 When L owns the land he
hires F to cultivate it, as in the standard landlord-tenant set-up. When F owns the land, he
cultivates it and borrows from L if necessary.
There are two states of the world, good and bad, and output in each state depends on the
chosen production technique. For simplicity assume that there is a continuum of techniques
indexed by the parameter t and that both output and production costs are increasing in t.
Finally, the probability of the good state depends on e ∈ [e
¯
, e¯], which represents the non-
contractible eﬀort that F devotes to cultivation.
In particular, production depends on eﬀort, on the state of the world, and on the chosen
technique as follows:
(i) Output is g(t) in the good state and b(t) in the bad state and g(t) > b(t), g0 > 0, b0 > 0
∀t
(ii) The good state occurs with probability p(e), p ∈ (0, 1), p0 > 0, p00 ≤ 0.
Note that (i) and (ii) imply that eﬀort and technique are complements in production.
Production costs are as follows:
(iii) technique t costs t;
(iv) eﬀort entails disutility d(e) for the farmer, where d0 > 0 and d00 ≥ 0.
The choice of t is assumed to be plot-specific. The analysis thus applies to problems such
as crop choice, which is the focus of the empirical analysis, but also the choice of irrigation
schemes, drainage systems and the level of mechanisation. It does not apply to non verifiable
techniques such as maintenance or to investments that are easily transferable, such as the
purchase of tractors or tools.
Without loss of generality, assume that L pays for t, that he keeps the entire output and
that he transfers cg and cb to F in the good and bad state, respectively. Depending on his
wealth, when F owns the land he might need to borrow from L to finance t ex-ante.
F 0s and L0s utility are equal to:
p(e) [cg] + (1− p (e)) [cb]− d(e) (UF )
p(e) [g(t)− cg] + (1− p (e)) [b(t)− cb]− t (UL)
1That property rights are fully defined implies that the owner has complete control over the asset (i.e. he
can sell it, bequeath it, mortgage it etc.). I do not analyse intermediate cases such as joint ownership of the
asset or the assignment of partial rights (for instance right to cultivate but not to sell etc.).
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Since e is non contractible, F will choose e to maximise UF , which yields the incentive
compatibility constraint:
(cg − cb) = q(e) =
d0(e)
p0(e)
(IC)
Assume that when contracts are signed L has all the bargaining power, regardless of the
distribution of property rights. This is without loss generality, as argued below, and it is an
appropriate assumption in cases when land and credit are scarce and labour is abudant.
Assume, moreover, that the reservation utility of the farmer is u1 if he owns the land and
u2 if he does not, where u1 ≥ u2. The reason why property rights aﬀect the disagreement
payoﬀ of the farmer is that if F and L do not reach an agreement and the farmer owns the
land he can still cultivate it on the basis of his own financial resources whereas if the farmer
does not own land he must seek employment elsewhere. The assumption reflects the fact that
the bargaining power of the owner-cultivator vis-a-vis the lender is larger than the bargaining
power of the tenant vis-a-vis the landlord. In other words, assuming that the reservation utility
of the farmer is higher when he owns the land is equivalent to assume that farmers who own
the land have more bargaining power when contracts are signed.
In what follows I will compare the choice of technique under the two alternative ownership
modes. I will presents two arguments that justify why the distribution of property rights might
aﬀect the choice of eﬀort and technique. Both theories predict that, for given parameters
ranges, the choice of t and e is ineﬃcient and that the extent of the ineﬃciency depend on the
distribution of property rights on land. The source of ineﬃciency, however, diﬀers.
The model in Section 2.3 follows the literature on tenancy contracts, property rights and
agricultural productivity (Mookherjee 1997, Banerjee et al 2001) and extends it to analyse
technique choice. It assumes that L and F can commit to the terms of the contract and
that F is subject to a limited liability constraint. The ineﬃciency arises from the fact that
the limited liability imposes an upper-bound on the punishment that L can inflict on F and
makes incentive provision costly. The distribution of property rights determines the farmer’s
disagreement payoﬀ ex-ante hence the level of the participation constraint, hence the structure
of optimal contract and the implied level of incentives, which in turn determine e and t.
The model in Section 2.4, on the other hand, assumes that the parties cannot credibly com-
mit to output-contingent contracts. In this case the distribution of property rights determines
the farmer’s disagreement payoﬀ ex-post. Indeed since both the non-contractible eﬀort and
the contractible investments are asset specific and ownership entails full control rights on the
asset, the owner always has an incentive to expropriate the other party. Thus, when L owns
the land he can expropriate F 0s investment in eﬀort, which is embodied in it. If, on the other
hand, F owns the land and borrows from L he would want to expropriate the returns of the
contractible investment.
Section 2.2 below analyses the benchmark case of unlimited liability and full commitment
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and shows that in this case first best can be achieved regardless of the distributions of property
rights. The result follows from the fact that, absent other constraints, the moral hazard
problem generated by the uncontractability of e can be solved by an appropriate incentive
compatible contract.
2.2 Benchmark Solution: Unlimited Liability, Full Commitment.
Since L has all the bargaining power he chooses (e, t, cb) to maximise his utility subject to F
0s
incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints. Denote the solution by e∗ and
t∗, the first order conditions are:
p0(e∗) [g (t∗)− b (t∗)]− d0(e∗) = 0 (FBe)
p(e∗)
£
g0 (t∗)− b0 (t∗)
¤
+ b0 (t∗)− 1 = 0 (FBt)
Since total (expected) welfare is equal to:
W = p(e)g (t) + (1− p(e))b (t)− t− d(e)
e∗ and t∗ are the first best levels of e and t, i.e the levels that maximise total welfare.
Intuitively L can induce the first best level of eﬀort by creating a suﬃciently large spread
between what F receives in the good and bad state and then extract all the surplus with a
lump-sum transfer. Since the first best level of eﬀort is chosen, the first best technique will be
chosen as well. Notice that the only diﬀerence between ownership modes is that F receives
a higher share of the surplus if his disagreement payoﬀ is larger when he owns the land. As
argued above, that L has all the bargaining power under both ownership structures is irrelevant
for the choice of (e, t): if F were to have more bargaining power the choice of (e, t) would be
the same although the distribution of surplus would diﬀer.
2.3 A model of limited liability (and full commitment).
Assume now that F is subject to a limited liability constraint such that cg+w ≥ s and cb+w ≥
s, where w is F 0s wealth and s his subsistence consumption. In order to provide incentives
for non contractible eﬀort, cg must be larger than cb so that only the second constraint would
bind, if any. Assume also that contracts are complete and fully enforceable.
The problem is the same as in section 2.2 above, with the addition of the limited liability
constraint.
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The first order conditions are:
p0[g(t)− b(t)]− d0 − (1− λ)pq0 = 0 (1)
p(e)[g0 − b0] + b0 − 1 = 0 (2)
λ+ θ = 1 (3)
Where λ and θ are the Lagrange multipliers for the individual rationality and the limited
liability constraint, respectively. The Appendix shows that due to the limited liability con-
straint, first best can be achieved if and only if farmer’s wealth is high enough (i.e. w + ui >
p(e∗)q(e∗)− d(e∗) + s). If not the limited liability constraint binds and both e and t are lower
than first best as shown by the following:
Result 1. Regardless of the distribution of property rights the choice of eﬀort and pro-
duction technique depends on the farmer’s wealth. If the farmer is poor the limited liability
constraint binds and both choices will be ineﬃcient under either ownership mode.
Intuitively if the limited liability constraint binds, L cannot simultaneously provide full
incentives and extract the whole surplus. In other words, since the lender/landlord must
guarantee a minimum level of consumption in the bad state, the only way of providing incentives
is to oﬀer a premium in the good state. It follows that, since the payment in the bad state is
higher for poor farmers2, providing incentives to poor farmers is costly, thus, in equilibrium,
less will be provided, leading to e < e∗. As a consequence, L will choose t < t∗.
The next result shows that if F is subject to limited liability the distribution of property
rights matter for the choice of (e, t).
Result 2. If the farmer is poor so that the limited liability constraint binds, the choice
of both eﬀort and techniques is weakly more eﬃcient under F 0s ownership than under L0s
ownership.
Result 2 derives from the fact that F 0s reservation utility is weakly higher when he owns
the land than when he does not. Notice that when both the limited liability and the individual
rationality constraint bind, eﬀort is chosen to satisfy the individual rationality constraint. Since
the equilibrium level of eﬀort is increasing in u, the level of eﬀort chosen under F 0s ownership is
weakly higher than the level of eﬀort chosen under L0s ownership. Intuitively, the ineﬃciency
2If the limited liability constraint binds cb = s− w.
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arises because, due to the lower bound on cb, L cannot simultaneously provide full incentives
and extract the whole surplus. In order to extract the entire surplus, that is to push F to his
reservation utility, L must reduce cg. By doing so, however, he reduces eﬀort incentives. The
higher is F 0s reservation utility, the lower the ineﬃciency, since the equilibrium level of cg, and
hence eﬀort incentives, is increasing in u.
Thus, if u is higher for a farmer who owns the land than for a farmer who does not, the
equilibrium level of e will be higher when the farmer owns the land. As argued above, u might
be higher for a farmer who owns the land because he can cultivate it using his own financial
resources if he does not reach an agreement with the lender. It then follows that if the farmer
is very poor, so that cultivation financed by own resources yields utility less or equal to u, then
the choice of (e, t) is the same under both ownership modes.
Summing up, the eﬀect of the distribution of property rights on investment depends on
farmers’ wealth as follows:
Result 3. The distribution of property rights matters for the choice of production tech-
niques when farmers’ wealth is neither too high nor too low. For intermediate levels of farmer’s
wealth, the choice will be closer to first best when the farmer owns the land.
Intuitively, when farmers’s wealth is high the limited liability constraint does not bind and
first best can be achieved regardless of the distribution of property rights. When farmers’
wealth is lower and the limited liability constraint binds the distribution of property rights
matters because farmers who own the land have a higher reservation utility, as explained above.
The reservation utility of a farmer who owns the land, however, depends on the expected profits
under self cultivation, which in turn are lower the lower his wealth. It follows that when farmers’
own financial resources are very low there is no diﬀerence between the reservation utility of a
farmer who owns the land and of a farmer who does not, so that, again, the distribution of
property rights does not matter. Figure 1 graphs the equilibrium level of t chosen under the
two alternative ownership modes as a function of the farmer’s wealth.
As noted by Mookherjee (1997) in this context land sales from landlords to tenant cannot
be Pareto improving. Indeed, since L has all the bargaining power he could oﬀer a contract
which mimicks the credit contract under farmer’s ownership if it were best for him to do so.
Intuitively, since because of limited liability the landlord cannot extract the extra surplus that
would arise if the farmer were to own the land, he is better oﬀ by not selling.
This also explains why in equilibrium the reservation utility of owner-farmers is higher
than the reservation utility of tenants: tenants would clearly prefer to own, as this guarantees
higher utility, but landlords are not willing to sell.
Note that if the farmer is subject to a limited liability constraint the distribution of bar-
gaining power does aﬀect the choice of (e, t). In particular, since the ineﬃciency arises from
L0s attempt to extract the entire surplus, any redistribution of bargaining power in favour
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of F will bring (e, t) closer to first best. If we assume that L and F Nash bargain over the
surplus and that the distribution of bargaining power does not depend on the distribution of
property rights the results presented above still hold except when F ’s bargaining weight is one.
In this, extreme, case the reservation utility of the farmer does not aﬀect the solution and, as
a consequence, the distribution of property rights does not matter.
Relatedly, it can be shown that the model yields similar result if one assumes that L
and F Nash bargain over the surplus and that, instead of increasing F 0s reservation utility,
landownership confers more bargaining power to the farmer.
2.4 A model of imperfect commitment (and unlimited liability).
When output can be easily disguised or the judicial system is weak or future contingencies are
too costly to specify, personal commitments are not credible and contracts conditional on out-
put are hard to enforce. Although one period output-contingent contracts are quite common in
agriculture —sharecropping being the most popular example— committing to contracts contin-
gent on future output is much more harduous. The fact that payments cannot be conditioned
on future output is particularly relevant for investments whose return accrue for a number of
periods in the future. This is clearly the case for trees that bear fruits for many years or for the
choice of any other durable technique for which the impact of eﬀort is long-lasting. To keep
matters simple, in what follows the choice of technique is still analysed within a one period
model; the inability to commit, however, should be interpreted as aﬀecting future, rather than
current, output.
When output contingent contracts are not enforceable, the landowner has an incentive to
expropriate the returns of the other party’s investment once the investment has been made.
Assume, as above, that there are only two possible level of output—good and bad— and that
output contingent contracts are not feasible. By definition the owner of the land holds the
residual control rights on land and its produce.
Consider first, the case in which F owns the plot. If F can aﬀord the first best level of
investment t∗, he does not need to borrow and the outcome is, trivially, first best at (e∗, t∗).
If, however, F 0s wealth is lower, he might want to borrow to employ a more expensive
technique and repay the loan once output has been realised. The lender then takes into
account that the farmer cannot commit to repay diﬀerent amounts in diﬀerent states and he
therefore maximises his utility from the loan subject to repayment being the same in both
states of the world. From this it follows that the repayment minus the cash advance F can
oﬀer must be less than the output in the bad state.
In the appendix it is shown that, when output contingent repayments are ruled out, the
problem reduces to:
max
R,t
R− t
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[p(e)[g(t)− b(t)] + b(t)−R− d(e)− S(w)] ≥ 0
p0(e)[g(t)− b(t)]− d0(e) = 0
b(t) +w −R ≥ 0
Where R is the repayment (principal plus interest), the first constraint is F 0s individual
rationality constraint, the second is the incentive compatibility constraint and the third is a
credit constraint. The credit constraint states that repayment cannot be larger than the output
in the bad state plus farmers’ wealth. Notice that this constraint puts an upper bound on the
amount L can recover and is therefore very diﬀerent from the limited liability constraint in
section 2.3 above. There L could not provide strong enough incentives to exert eﬀort as he
could not punish enough in the bad state. Here incentive provision is not an issue: since F gets
the full marginal benefit of his eﬀort, he will always choose the first best e —which of course
depends on t.3
The solution —discussed in the Appendix— shows that the equilibrium (e, t) depend on the
wealth of the farmer as follows:
Result 4. When the farmer owns the land first best can be achieved only if the farmer is
rich enough. In other words, there exist w¯(< t∗) such that for all w > w¯ , the lender finances
up to t*, the first best level. For all w<w¯, both the choices of eﬀort and technique are ineﬃcient
and the ineﬃciency is decreasing in wealth.
Proof: see Appendix
Intuitively, when the farmer is rich enough, he needs only needs to borrow a small amount
to finance t. In this case the output in the bad state is enough for the lender to recover the
principal plus interest. When the farmer is poor, however, the lender does not want to finance
t up to first best, because the output in the bad state would not allow him to recover the
amount invested. The ineﬃciency derives from the fact that F cannot commit to repay more
in the good state.
Consider now the case in which L owns the land. In this case it is L who cannot commit
to pay diﬀerent amounts in diﬀerent states. This aﬀects F 0s eﬀort incentives: since he gets the
same payment in the good and bad state, he has no incentive to put in eﬀort and will choose
the lowest possible level e
¯
. Anticipating this, L will choose the optimal t given e
¯
. The problem
thus reduces to:
3It can be argued that since there is no limited liability L could use non monetary punishments to induce
truth telling, nevertheless such contracts would still be renegotiated since a non-monetary punishment provides
no direct utility to the lender.
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max
cb,t
L = (b(t)− cb)− t
cb − d(e
¯
)− u ≥ 0
The solution, reported in the appendix, yields:
Result 5. When L owns the land the choices of both eﬀort and techniques are ineﬃcient.
Moreover, the ineﬃciency does not depend on the farmer’s wealth.
Intuitively, since the landlord cannot credibly provide incentives for eﬀort he will choose
t<t* given that t and e are complements. In contrast to the results of Section 2.3 the equilib-
rium (e, t) do not depend on F 0s wealth. The reason is that there the ineﬃciency stem from
the fact that, due to limited liability, the landlord could not provide full incentives to poor
tenants. Here, however, the ineﬃciency derives from the fact that the landlord cannot credibly
commit to an incentive compatible contract, regardless of tenant’s wealth.
Comparing the results obtained when F owns the land to those obtained when L owns the
land, yields:
Result 6. The distribution of property rights matters for the choice of eﬀort and technique
when farmers’ wealth is not too low. In this case, both the choice of eﬀort and technique are
closer to first best when the farmer owns the land.
Intuitively,the choice of technique does not depend on F ’s wealth when L owns the land,
since L cannot provide eﬀort incentives to rich and poor farmers alike. In contrast, when F
owns the land, investment does depend on wealth. The richer is F , the less he will need to
borrow from L, the lower is the ineﬃciency from lack of commitment. Compared to the limited
liability model above, here there is a fundamental asymmetry. That contingent contracts are
not feasible always generates a loss of eﬃciency if L owns the land, but only when F is poor
if F owns the land.
The model analysed in this section is an extreme case of the hold-up problem. In a more
general model, with a longer time horizon, the parties would renegotiate the contract once
investments have been made. In the context of an incomplete contract model, however, results
would be similar to the those above, at least as long as the change in the relative bargaining
power of the parties ex-post does not depend on farmers’ wealth.
Finally, note that, in this context, land sales are Pareto improving as long as the inability
to commit to output contingent contracts does not seriously hinder the ability of the landlord
to extract the extra surplus deriving from farmer’s ownership. 4
4Aside from the eﬀects of limited liability and imperfect commitment, land sales would not be Pareto im-
proving if land had value over and above its productive use. It has been argued that, for instance, land confers
political power in countries where it is scarce so that the increase in productivity which would arise if the tenant
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3 Empirical Analysis: Tree Crops in Rural Nicaragua.
3.1 Context, Data and Econometric Model.
Context Nicaragua is among the poorest countries in the American continent: in 1998,per
capita GNP was $430 and about 50% of the population lived below the poverty line. As of
1998, agriculture accounted for one third of GDP and almost one half of the population lived
in rural areas. During the last 50 years Nicaragua has suﬀered from two natural catastro-
phes5 and serious civil strife. After twenty years of guerrilla, the Sandinista National Liberal
Front (FSLN) led a successful insurrection in 1979 and ruled for 10 years, after which it lost a
democratic election against the National Opposition Union.
The chain of political events which began in 1979 has had a profound impact on land
distribution, on land markets and on the structure of tenancy agreements. The existing pattern
of land distribution derives from a number of land reforms enacted between 1981 and 1997.
Until 1981, land distribution was extremely concentrated: 20% of the country land, for instance,
were owned by the dictator’s family alone. In 1981, the FSLN expropriated large extensions
of land —either abandoned, undercultivated or rented out— and redistributed it to landless
peasants, existing tenants and farmers’ co-operatives.6 The democratic government elected
in 1990 promulgated a number of laws7 which recognised and legitimised the property rights
acquired by farmers through the FSLN land reform. In addition to recognising existing farmers’
rights the aforementioned law also established indemnification procedures for expropriated
owners and privatisation and redistribution of State owned land to small farmers. Finally, the
government also took measures to restore the real property registry and to favour land titling,
both by creating new titles for newly redistributed land and by converting existing titles.
Land markets in Nicaragua are highly imperfect for a number of reasons. Under the FSLN
regime, land rights could only be bequeathed or used as collateral to obtain credit. Land
sales and divisions were forbidden until 1990. After then rights could be traded although the
transfer of rights acquired through the land reforms of 1995 and 1997 was again limited to
bequests and collateral for a period of five years after the issue of the title. Furthermore, the
lack of a consistent nationwide landownership record combined with the fact that with the
FSLN reform new titles were assigned without revoking the old ones, substantially increase
were to purchase the land is not enough to compensate large landowners for the loss of political power (see
Baland and Robinson 2001 for a formal model). This is especially true for poor tenants, whose productivity as
owner cultivators would be lower as shown above. Relatedly, land also provides a good hedge against inflation
so that again, landlords are better oﬀ by not selling if tenants cannot adequately compensate for the value of
land as a store of wealth. Finally, because of registry fees, notary fees and land sale taxes, selling land often
entails large transaction costs which might be higher than the potential productivity gain.
5A major earthquake (1972) and a devastating hurricane (1998) had a profound impact on the Nicaraguan
economy.
6See Apropriacion por el estado de los bienes abandonados Decreto No. 760, and Ley de reforma agraria.
Decreto No. 782
7See Decreto-Ley de revision de confiscaciones (Decreto 11-90), Ley de estabilidad de la propriedad (Ley
No.209) and Ley sobre propriedad reformada urbana y agraria (Ley No.278).
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the transaction costs for land sales, as identifying the rightful owner is quite expensive and
time consuming.
Data I use household data from the 1998 Nicaragua Living Standard Measurement Survey
complemented with village data from the 1995 Nicaragua Census.
The 1998 survey contains detailed information on the agricultural activities of 1497 house-
holds. Of these, 56% farm their own plots, 38% farm rented plots and 6% farm both own and
rented plots. The data also contains information on household demographics, other economic
activities and on the value of household’s assets —consumer durables, farm assets, business
assets, livestock and house value— which can be aggregated to build a measure of wealth.
I use the 1995 Census to collect information at the village level such as size, distance to
market, average education level, religious fractionalisation and proxies for infrastructure.
The analysis focuses on the choice between growing a mix of annual and tree crops versus
growing annual crops only. With a few exceptions, the main tree crops grown in Nicaragua
—coﬀee, citrus, bananas and mangoes— are more profitable and also more eﬀort intensive com-
pared to annual crops —maize, beans, cassava.8 Growing tree crops in combination with annual
crops can be more profitable than growing annual crops alone because, besides being more
profitable on their own right, tree crops enhance nutrients recycling, conserve soil moisture,
maintain fertility and reduce soil erosion.9 Growing annual crops alone, however, is cheaper
and less eﬀort intensive.10 The relative profitability of one technique over the other then
ultimately depends on the level of eﬀort exerted by the farmer.
In terms of the theoretical models, growing annual crops alone corresponds to a lower t.
Note that t is complementary to eﬀort since, due to the higher variance of tree production, the
spread between the good and bad state is higher when tree crops are grown in combination
with annual crops.11
The survey asks farmers to name the two main crops they grow and then collects informa-
tion on every crop grown in the last twelve months.12 It does not, however, contain precise
information on the area devoted to each crop. To separate farmers who grow a mix of trees
8The potential exceptions are mangoes —which seem to require very little eﬀort— and possibly bananas. The
results, however, are robust to the exclusion of mangoes and bananas from the group of eﬀort intensive tree
crops.
9Agroforestry (the combination of annual and perennial crops) has recently been promoted by most agr-
cultural development institutions (see www.fao.org or www.icraf.cgiar.org) and NGOs. Current et al (1996)’s
study of 21 agroforestry projects in Central America show that this practice is profitable under a broad range
of conditions.
10The sample average fertiliser expenditure, for instance, is about twice as high (406 vs. 217 cordobas) for
farmers who grow a combination of trees and annual crops.
11It can be argued that, on top of determining output in the good and bad state, crop characteristics also
aﬀect the relative probability, with tree crops being more likely to fail at any eﬀort level. In terms of the models
above this implies p(e, t) with pt < 0. It can be shown that the results carry through as long as pe is suﬃciently
large or pt suﬃciently small. If this is not the case, t can be employed to reduce the moral hazard problem as
an increase in t makes expected output less sensitive to e.
12Farmers in the sample grow on average four diﬀerent crops.
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and annual crops from those who grow annual crops only I define two variables. The first,
crop mix is equal to 1 when the farmer grows at least one tree crop. The second, mainmix,
is equal to 1 when at least one of the main crops is a tree.13 These two variables represent,
respectively, an upper and a lower bound estimate of the number of farmers that grow tree
crops. The first variable overestimates the number of farmers who choose a combination of tree
and annual crops since, according to the definition a farmer counts as growing bananas even if
he has only one tree. As reported in Table 1.1, about 56% of the farmers in the sample grow a
mix of annual and tree crops. The second variable underestimates the number of farmers who
grow tree crops because it only counts those farmers for whom these are one of the two most
important crops (farmers grow on average four diﬀerent crops). As reported in Table 1.1, the
sample average of mainmix is just 8%.
Table 1.1 also reports the means and standard deviations of the variables employed in the
analysis, both for the whole sample and for the sub-sample of pure owners and tenants. Note
that owner-cultivators are on average richer, older and farm larger plots than tenants. Also,
owner-cultivators have, on average, been farming the current plot for a longer time. Education,
however, does not vary by ownership status and both owner cultivators and tenants seem
equally distributed across villages.
At first sight there is a clear diﬀerence between crops grown by tenants and owner culti-
vators, as the latter are significantly more likely to grow a mix of annual and tree crops. The
diﬀerence is particularly striking for coﬀee (13% vs. 3%).
Econometric Model and Main Concerns.
Contrary to the theoretical model, here the choice of technique is discrete. Letmixi ∈ {0, 1}
be a variable that equals 1 if farmer i grows trees or a combination of trees and annual crops.
Farmer i will prefer to grow trees when the expected returns from doing so Ri(trees) are larger
than the expected returns from annual crops, that is
mixi =
½
1 if Ri(trees)−Ri(annual) > 0
0 otherwise
[1]
In what follows I employ a linear probability model to estimate the discrete choice model in
(1). The linear probability model has a number of advantages with respect to discrete choice
models such as probit or logit. In particular, it is possible to include household fixed eﬀects
without biasing the coeﬃcients and omitting relevant variables is of less consequence because
the coeﬃcients of the included variables are biased only if the two are correlated. The drawback
of the linear model is that it might yield estimates outside the feasible range, especially when
the mean of the dependent variable is close to 0 or 1. The mean of the main dependent variable
13The main tree crops are coﬀee, banana, mango, and citrus. Since coﬀee and citrus are more expensive
and more eﬀort intensive than annual crops while mangoes and bananas may not be, I have also redefined the
dependent variable as coﬀee&citrus, which is equal to 1 when the farmer farms at least one coﬀee or citrus tree
together with annual crops.
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used in the analysis is, in this case, 0.56 and estimates are then very rarely outside the feasible
range. 14 The general crop choice equation I estimate is of the form:
mixiv = αowniv + βxiv + δzv + eiv (2)
Where mixiv denotes the choice of farmer i in village v. The variable owniv equals 1 if
farmer i owns the plot, and zero otherwise. Farmers’ specific variables (xiv) in most specifica-
tions include wealth, education, age, gender, social capital (proxied by the number of groups
the farmer belongs to), value of livestock and the size of the cultivated plot. These are in-
cluded to control for farmers’ characteristics which could aﬀect crop choice and, if omitted,
create a spurious relationship between ownership status and the dependent variable. Finally,
village specific variables (zv) include total population (a proxy for village size) and distance
to market. The reason is that tree crops are mostly commercialised rather than consumed at
home. Exchange is presumably easier in larger villages and transportation costs are lower in
villages which are closer to a market place.15 To control for other geographical and/or policy
characteristics, all the regressions are run with province fixed eﬀects.
The identification of the eﬀect of ownership on crop choice presents two main econometric
problems. First, ownership itself might be endogenous, i.e. driven by some omitted character-
istics that also drives crop choice. To address this issue I use the information on the famers who
cultivate both owned and rented plot and estimate (2) with farmers’ fixed eﬀects to control for
individual heterogeneity, that is I estimate:
mixij = αownij + bi + γyij + eij (3)
Where now mixij denotes the choice of farmer i on plot j, bi is the farmer fixed eﬀect and
only plot varying characteristics (i.e. size) can be included in the regression.
Second, the survey contains no information on plot characteristics other than size. The
estimate of the eﬀect of ownership on crop choice could therefore be biased if (i) tree crops
necessitate a specific soil type and (ii) all plots of that soil type are cultivated by owners.
The available evidence, however, suggest that neither (i) nor (ii) are relevant in this context.
First, the agronomic evidence (see Table A1) shows that although individual crops might have
specific soil requirements, as a group the annual and tree crops in the sample do not have
drastically diﬀerent soil requirements. In other words, it is generally possible to find at least
one tree that can grow in any given soil type.16 Second, the evidence on cropping pattern
14Moreover, the model yields similar results when estimated by probit or logit.
15As a further control, I have also run all the regressions including a categorical variable that equals 0 if the
village is not on a paved road, 1 if it is on a secondary road, 2 if on a main road, 3 if on the highway. This
variable was never significant. This and other results not reported for reasons of space are available from the
author upon request.
16The only exception is that all trees require Ph. levels below 8.5 while some of the annual crops can grow
up to 9. Such high values, however, are quite rare.
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indirectly suggest that there is no systematic diﬀerence in terms of soil quality between own
and rented plots. For instance, cassava, a crop that is typically grown on very low quality
soil, is actually more likely to be grown by owner-cultivators, whereas millet, another ”poor”
crop is equally likely to be cultivated by owners and tenants, on average. To check robustness,
however, I have also estimated (1) using village fixed eﬀects. That is:
mixiv = αowni + βxi + dv + eiv (4)
The idea behind (4) is that since soil characteristics are more likely to vary across villages
than within each village, if the results are driven by unobservable soil quality, this should
be, at least in part, be picked up by the village fixed eﬀects ( dv). A large change in α
therefore indicates that soil characteristics or other village specific variables are important
omitted variables. Finally, although specific evidence for Nicaragua is not available, in diﬀerent
contexts many other studies have not found a significant relationship between crop choice and
measures of soil quality (Besley 1998, Goldstein and Udry 1999), or between soil quality and
tenure status (Shaban 1987).
3.2 Main Results
Basic Specification.
The first column of table (2) reports the cross-section estimates (equation (2)). The results
suggest that, in line with both theories, trees are more likely to be grown in owner-cultivated
plots.17 Also, richer farmers are more likely to grow trees and, when significant, the coeﬃcient
on livestock value is negative, suggesting that trees and animal husbandry are substitutes.
The results also show that trees are more likely to be grown by farmers who belong to some
social association/group and by farmers who live in large villages and/or villages that are close
to the market, which presumably derives from the fact that tree crops are mostly grown for
commercialisation rather than home consumption.
The second column of table 2 presents the empirical estimates of equation (3), that it
includes farmer’s fixed eﬀects. The results show that, even controlling for every source of
heterogeneity, land distribution matters: a given farmer is more likely to grow trees on the
17It could be argued that the result derives from omitted variable bias since land ownership might be a
choice variable. The fixed eﬀects estimates below suggest that this is not the case. Nevertheless, to address
this issue in the larger sample I have controlled for whether owners have bought their plots or whether they
have received it in inheritance or after a land reform. Although ownership might still be endogenous even if
the farmer has not bought the plot (e.g. because among sons only the best farmers inherit the family plot), if
results derive exclusively from the endogeneity of ownership we expect the coeﬃcient of ownership to change
when acquisition mode is controlled for as the endogeneity problem is more serious when the farmer has bought
the land. However, the results, available from the Author upon request, show that the coeﬃcient of ownership
is unchanged and the mode of acquisition does not enter significantly.
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fields he owns than on the fields he rents. The coeﬃcient on the ownership variable is significant
at more than the 1% level, which is quite surprising given the small sample size.
Column (3) presents the estimates of equation (4), i.e. it includes village fixed eﬀects to
control for diﬀerences in land quality as discussed above. As expected, the point estimates
of the ownership variable and wealth are slightly lower, but not significantly so. This then
suggest that although the ownership variable might proxy for village level non-observables,
this accounts for a small part of its eﬀect on the choice of crop mix.18
Finally, in the cross-section estimates the dependent variable is mix, which equals one
when the farmer grows at least one tree. As explained above, this variable overestimates the
number of farmers who grow tree crops and thus provides a lower bound estimate of the eﬀect
of ownership on crop choice. To obtain an estimate of the upper bound I estimated equation
(2) using mainmix (=1 if one of the two main crops is a tree) as the dependent variable
(column (4)). As expected the relative impact of ownership on crop choice is much stronger in
this case. Evaluating at the sample mean, if the plot is farmed by its owner, the probability of
there being at least one tree is about 20% higher while the probability of trees being a main
crop doubles.
Does ownership matter less when farmers are poor?
Both models predict that landownership should not aﬀect crop choice when the farmer is
very poor and, according to the limited liability story, when the farmer is very rich either.
To test this prediction I have split the sample in five subsamples along wealth quintiles. The
result presented in Table 3 show that indeed landownership does not matter when the farmer
is poor (i.e. when he belongs to the 1st and 2nd quintiles) but it does when the farmer is rich.
Note that, when significant, the coeﬃcient of owner is larger in the subsamples than it was in
the entire sample, suggesting that the previous estimate of the eﬀect of landownership on crop
choice was biased downwards by the presence of poor farmers. Note also that, in line with the
predictions of the limited liability model, landownership has a no eﬀect on crop choice when
the farmer is rich. This, however, might be due to the low variance of the ownership variable:
90% of farmers in the fifth quintile are owners.19
Testing between models.
Table 4 estimates whether the impact of wealth on crop choice diﬀers according to whether
the plot is cultivated by the owner or by a tenant. Column (1) includes an interaction term
between wealth and the ownership variable, whereas columns (2) and (3) estimate equation
18I also experimented with other individual specific variables such as number of years farming the same plot,
wife’s education, household’s composition, whether the farmer received technical assistance, whether the farmer
belonged to a producers’ group, whether the farmer had reported to be credit constrained. None of these were
significant.
19The remainder of the distribution is as follows:
1st quintile: 30% owners; 2nd quintile 50% owners, 3rd quintile 60% owners, 4th quintile 70% owners.
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[2] for tenants and owner-cultivators separately. The evidence suggest that, in this context,
the ineﬃciency seems to derive from the inability to commit rather than from limited liability.
According to the latter, wealth should aﬀect crop choice regardless of whether the farmer owns
the land or not. The results instead suggest that wealth only matters when the farmer owns
the land: the interaction term is positive and significant while the wealth coeﬃcient is not
significant in column (1). Moreover, the coeﬃcient is significantly diﬀerent from zero in the
owner-cultivators subsample alone.
There are a number of reasons why the inability to commit to output contingent contracts
might be the relevant source of ineﬃciency in this particular context. First, since trees are
long lived and since eﬀort aﬀects their long term profitability, the result might derive from
the fact that long-term commitments are typically more diﬃcult to adhere to. Second, even
if long-term agreements were credible, landlords might be unwilling to commit to a long term
contract because this might eventually grant land rights to the tenant. This issue is of great
relevance in Nicaragua where in 1981 rented land was redistributed from large landowners
to tenants and sharecroppers20 and where the present Consititution and Reform Laws favour
small owner-cultivators and makes it diﬃcult to evict long-term tenants.21 As a consequence
most tenancy contracts in the sample are short-term (see Table 5).
Not surprisingly, trees are more likely to be grown on rented plots when the contract is
long-term (column (5)). Interestingly, it is the length of the contract, rather than the duration
of the relationship that matters. That is, tenants who have been farming the same plot for
long are not more likely to grow trees unless the contract is long-term as well. Column (5) also
shows that tenants who have received technical assistance are more likely to farm trees, possibly
a reflection of the fact that tenants who have acquired special skills are more ”irreplaceable”,
which, in turn, makes long-term commitments more credible. Still, it might be argued that
technical assistance is endogenous because tree crops are more diﬃcult to cultivate, implying
that farmers who grow them need more technical assistance. If this were the case, however,
technical assistance should be positively correlated with trees regardless of the ownership mode,
but assistance is not significant when the farmer owns the land (column (4)).22
Finally, one might expect the lack of commitment that drives the results of the incomplete
contract model to be less serious if the tenant and his landlord belong to the same family
because repeated interactions might help sustain the cooperative outcome. This view is not
supported by the empirical evidence: the relationship between tenants and landlords does not
aﬀect crop choice.
That wealth aﬀects crop choice for owner-cultivators suggest that credit markets are im-
20See Decreto No.782 19/7/81, Artt.2 and 9.
21See e.g. Constitution Politica,Titulo VI, Cap. II.
22Technical assistance could be proxying for tenant entreprenuership, i.e. only the most ”active” tenants seek
assistance, which would still fit the story of the tenant being less replaceable. The argument could go the other
way though, i.e. only bad tenants need assistance.
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perfect. The imperfection can derive, as illustrated by the theoretical models, either from
limited liability or from the inability to commit. From the questionnaire we learn that only
20% of farmers are currently in debt (see Table 6). Most of the others (about 80%) wanted to
borrow but could not, either because they would be rejected, because loans are too expensive
or because there are no lenders in the community. Only 20% of non-borrowing farmers do not
borrow because they do not need or do not want to. Not surprisingly, wealthy farmers are
more likely to not need or want loans.23
Note that owner-cultivators are more likely to grow trees the longer they have held the plot
(column (4)). The results might be driven by tenure security: the longer a farmer holds a plot,
the less likely he is to lose it because of title disputes. This is quite a serious issue in Nicaragua,
where, because of the sequence of land reforms enacted by diﬀerent governments there can be
up to three title-holders for the same plot.24 Not surprisingly, holding a title of any kind has
no significant eﬀect on crop choice. Moreover, only 10% of the farmers who do not have a title,
report to be afraid of losing their land. This suggest that de facto tenure security is more
relevant than formal titling. Still it must be noted that the new titling programme has only
started very recently25 so that no definite conclusion can be drawn at this stage.
3.3 Other Econometric Concerns and Robustness Checks.
The definition of wealth raises a number of concerns. First, since wealth does not include
land value ownership might just be proxying for wealth, i.e. capturing the fact that owners
can use the land as collateral, which gives them better access to credit and hence makes them
more likely to grow trees. Land value is excluded in the wealth measure because it might be
endogenous as trees might make a plot more valuable. Regardless of this, if ownership were
just proxying for land value we would expect its coeﬃcient to fall once land value is controlled
for. Column (1) in Table 7 shows this is not so. The point estimate of the land ownership
coeﬃcient does not change when land value is included in the measure of wealth. Columns
(3) and (4) show two more robustness checks on wealth definition. In column (3) the value
of farm assets is excluded from the definition of wealth on the grounds that it too might be
endogenous, which could be if trees required more expensive tools. Column (4) uses household
durables, the most parsimonious definition of wealth.
Relatedly, wealth might be endogenous because since tree crops are more profitable, farmers
who grow them might have become richer as a consequence. That is, the causality relationship
might run from trees to wealth rather than the other way. More subtly, wealth endogeneity
might be responsible for the diﬀerent impact of wealth on crop choices in owned and rented
23About 30% of farmers in the fifth wealth quintile and about 10% in the first quintile state they do not need
or want to borrow.
24That is, there are pre-reform, old-reform and new-reform titles.
25Law 209 (1995) established that existing titles could be converted to permanent titles while Law 278 (1997)
streamlined the process.
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plots. That is, if one assumes that profits mostly accrue to the owner of the land, then trees
would increase the wealth of owner-cultivators but not that of tenants.
To address these issues I have re-estimated equation [1] by 2SLS using wife’s parents ed-
ucation and village characteristics as instruments for wealth. Village characteristics include:
median land value from the survey and measures of education (% of literate, primary and
secondary school), of religious fragmentation and of infrastructure (% of houses with direct
water supply) from the 1995 Census. The underlying assumption is that farmers’ wealth is
likely to be higher in richer villages, that is villages with higher median land value and better
infrastructure (proxied by educational achievements and house water supply). The identifying
assumption is that the instruments are not variables of choice for the farmer and that they
do not determine the farmer’s crop choice, both of which seem reasonable. 26 Indeed, endo-
geneity could potentially arise if farmers were to sort themselves across village according to
village characteristics. According to the Census, however, 95% of the resident population of
was born in the villages under study. The 2SLS estimates are reported in column (2), Table
8: the coeﬃcient of wealth is still positive and significant and that the other coeﬃcients are
unchanged. Interestingly, the wealth coeﬃcient is much larger after instrumenting, which may
indicate measurement error in the wealth variable. From the first stage regression (column (1))
we see that the instruments are a good predictor of wealth and have reasonable signs.27 To test
for overidentifying restrictions, I have regressed the second stage residuals on the instruments
and other exogenous variables and then tested the significance of the instruments. The test,
whose p-value is reported in the penultimate row of column (2) passes comfortably. Moreover,
the Hausman test (last row of column (2)) fails to reject the null hypothesis of systematic
coeﬃcient diﬀerence, thus suggesting that wealth endogeneity might not be a serious issue in
this case.28 Also, results are robust to using the diﬀerent definitions of wealth as in table
7. Finally, to check whether wealth is endogenous for owner-cultivators only, I have run the
tests and 2SLS regression above for the sub-samples of owner- cultivators and tenants sepa-
rately. Also in this case, the results suggest that the wealth eﬀect appears not to be due to
endogeneity.29
26As a further check I have experimented with diﬀerent subsets of instruments. The results are robust to a
number of diﬀerent combinations, including dropping the wife’s parents education variables that are, potentially,
the most problematic.
27At the individual level, farmers whose father in law had formal education have higher wealth. At the village
level, farmers who live in villages where the median land value is higher, where there is better infrastructure
(proxied by water supply), where the percentage of primary and secondary school graduates is higher and that
are more religiously homogeneous are wealthier. The negative coeﬃcient on the percentage of literate can be
interpreted together with the positive coeﬃcients on primary and secondary school graduates as a proxy for
poor education infrastructure. That is, a higher literacy rate coupled with a low primary school record might
proxy for lack of schools in the village.
28A further concern is that livestock value and crop choice might be jointly determined. Results are robust
to instrumenting for livestock value.
29The following robustness checks are not presented for reasons of space: (i) reproducing tables 2 to 8 for
diﬀerent definitions of the dependent variable; (ii) reproducing tables 2 to 8 for diﬀerent definitions of wealth;
(iii) excluding distance to market from the regressions. Reason for the latter being that a larger sample is
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4 Related Literature
This paper relates to the large literature that analyses the impact of asymmetric information on
agricultural productivity. Its contribution is twofold. First, it presents an explicit comparison
of alternative ownership structures. Second, it analyses, both theoretically and empirically,
one specific channel through which the pattern of land ownership aﬀects productivity, namely
the choice of contractible techniques.
Most of the existing literature aims to explain how the structure of tenancy contracts aﬀects
productivity on rented plots. The earlier literature focussed on explaining why sharecropping
exists despite its ineﬃciency (Stiglitz (1974), Shetty (1988), Eswaran and Kotwal (1984)). Most
recent papers have analysed alternative incentive mechanisms and other contractual dimen-
sions. These include the impact of eviction threats on eﬀort and non-contractible investment
(Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2001), Banerjee and Ghatak (2001), Dutta, Ray and Sengupta
(1989)); the use of contract length as an incentive mechanism for non-contractible investment
(Bandiera (2001)); and the role of sharecropping in the context of multitasking (Botticini
(1999)).
The empirical literature on tenancy contracts provides evidence that contractual structure
aﬀects productivity as suggested by the theory. Using data from six villages in three Indian
States, Shaban (1987) shows that farmers produce less output per acre on sharecropped plots
than on their own plots. Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2001) show that increased tenure
security had a positive impact on agricultural productivity growth in West Bengal. Laﬀont
and Matoussi (1995) show that Tunisian sharecroppers are less productive than fixed-rent
tenants.
Unlike these previous studies, which exclusively analyse the determinants of productivity on
rented plots, this paper explicitly compares owned and rented plots. Such direct comparisons
are rare in the literature mostly because it is implicitily assumed that transferring ownership
to the farmer would eliminate the problems deriving from information asymmetry and achieve
eﬃciency. One exception is Mookherjee (1997) who recognises that land redistribution per se
does not guarantee first best since if the farmer needs to borrow, information asymmetries
might aﬀect the outcome even when he owns the land. In the same line as Mookherjee (1997),
this paper explicitly models the contractual relationship between owner-cultivators and lenders.
Another point of departure from the existing literature is that the present paper analyses
a specific mechanism through which land distribution might aﬀect agricultural productivity,
that is the choice of contractible techniques. Recognising that asymmetric information has an
eﬀect on the choice of contractible inputs over and above its eﬀects on eﬀort has two main
advantages. First, it makes clear that the eﬀect of land distribution on productivity might be
stronger than if based on diﬀerences in eﬀort alone. Second since, unlike eﬀort, techniques are
available (1304 instead of 1172). Results are robust to these alternative specifications.
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observable the predictions of the theory can be tested directly.
Both Braverman and Stiglitz (1986) and Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2001) explicitly
model the choice of contractible techniques but focus exclusively on the case in which the
landowner delegates the cultivation of its plots. Braverman and Stiglitz (1986) show that
if landlords can only employ pure sharecropping contracts30 they may want to resist some
specific innovations which increase output a little but lower the marginal product of eﬀort
by a lot. The intuition is that since the landlord is bound to a pure sharecropping contract,
in order to extract the surplus from the innovation and keep the tenant at his reservation
utility, he must necessarily lower the tenant’s share. Lowering the tenant’s share, however,
reduces incentives and can ultimately make the landlord worse oﬀ. Banerjee, Gertler and
Ghatak (2001) endogenise contractual structure in the context of a principal-agent model with
limited liability. They show that, since limited liability imposes a constraint on the set of
feasible contracts, equilibrium eﬀort is low and landlords are less likely to make contractible
investments complementary to eﬀort when the tenant is poor.
The existing evidence on the relationship between land distribution and the choice of con-
tractible techniques is quite slim. Feder et al (1985) report that studies of HYV adoption
in India show no clear pattern. Bharadwaj (1974) analysis of Indian farm management data,
however, shows that most of the productivity diﬀerential between small family and large rented
farms can be attributed to diﬀerent crop choices.
Finally, this paper also relates to the literature that studies whether formal, better defined
and/or more complete land rights aﬀect investment incentives and technology adoption. In
theory better private rights should enhance tenure security and hence promote investment both
because they facilitate the access to credit and because, as opposed to communal rights, they
guarantee that the investor capture the full marginal benefit of his eﬀort. Besley (1995), for
instance, finds that better-defined rights promote investment in trees in a region of Ghana.
Besley (1998), however, surveys the existing evidence and shows that, in some cases, property
rights have been found to be irrelevant for investment. This paper and the literature above
share the focus on incentives for contractible investments. Unlike that literature, however, this
paper focusses on the distribution, rather than the definition, of property rights on land.
5 Discussion and Conclusions.
This paper has presented two theoretical arguments that illustrate how the distribution of
property rights on land may aﬀect the choice of production techniques and, through this,
agricultural productivity when output depends on non-contractible eﬀort. The first argument
is based on limited liability which makes incentive provision costly and thus discourages the use
of techniques that are complementary to eﬀort. The second relies on the fact that land owners
30That is, if non-contingent payments are ruled out.
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cannot commit to output contingent contracts which limits borrowing when the farmer owns
the land and makes incentive provision impossible when the farmer does not, and therefore
also discourages the use of techniques that are complementary to eﬀort. In both cases the
outcome can be ineﬃcient regardless of the distribution of property rights, but it is generally
more eﬃcient when the farmer owns the land.
The empirical analysis of crop choice in rural Nicaragua shows that, in line with both
theories, owner cultivators choose a riskier, more eﬀort intensive and more profitable crop mix.
The analysis also shows that the inability to commit, rather than limited liability, seems to be
the main source of ineﬃciency.
There are a number of reasons why the inability to commit to output contingent contracts
might be the relevant source of ineﬃciency in this particular context. First, since trees are
long lived and since eﬀort aﬀects their long term profitability, the result follows from the fact
that long-term commitments are typically more diﬃcult to adhere to. An interesting question
is whether limited liability would be the binding constraint when the feasible techniques have
the same time horizon. Second, landlords may be unwilling to commit to a long term contract
because this might eventually grant land rights to the tenant. This issue is of great relevance
in Nicaragua where in the past land has been expropriated in favour of tenants and where
most tenancy contracts are indeed short term.
Although productivity is higher when farmers own the land, tenancy is quite common and
land sales are not frequent. Data on land transactions are needed to establish which factors,
other than productivity, determine land value and hence land sales. In particular, it would
be interesting to assess to what extent land sales are constrained by registry imperfection and
title uncertainty and to what extent they are limited by credit constraints or political reasons.
Finally, the analysis also suggest that redistributing land to farmers would foster agri-
cultural productivity because it improves the choice of eﬀort and of other inputs that are
complementary to it. Since the inability to commit seems to be the main cause of ineﬃciency,
any kind of land reform that makes tenancy more secure or promotes the use of long term
contracts would be similar to land redistribution in terms of its eﬀect on the choice of eﬀort
and production techniques.
6 Appendix: Models
6.1 First Best
The problem is:
max
e,t,cb
L = p(e)[g(t)− b(t)]− p(e)q(e) + b(t)− cb−t+ λ [p(e)q(e) + cb − d(e)− ui]
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The first order conditions w.r.t. ( e, t, cb) are:
p0[g(t)− b(t)]− d0−(1− λ)pq0= 0 (4)
p(e)[g0−b0] + b0−1 = 0 (5)
λ = 1 (6)
Substituting the third equation into the first one shows that (e, t) which solve this problem are the same
as first best. cb = ui + d(e
∗)− p(e∗)q(e∗) from the IR constraint.
6.2 The Limited Liability Model
I assume that L has full bargaining power and that he pays for t. The problem then is:
maxcg,cb,t{p(e)(g(t)− cg) + (1− p(e))(b(t)− cb)− t} s.t.
p0(e)[cg − cb]− d0(e) = 0 (IC)
p(e)cg + (1− p(e))cb − d(e) ≥ u (IR)
cb +w − s ≥ 0 (LL)
Plugging in the IC and rearranging terms the lagrangian of the problem is:
max
e,t,cb
L = p(e)[g(t)− b(t)]− p(e)q(e) + b(t)− cb − t+ λ [p(e)q(e) + cb − d(e)− ui]
+θ [cb +w − s]
The first order conditions w.r.t. ( e, t, cb) are:
p0[g(t)− b(t)]− d0−(1− λ)pq0= 0 (7)
p(e)[g0−b0] + b0−1 = 0 (8)
λ+ θ = 1 (9)
There are three possible cases:
CASE 1. LL does not bind, IR does.
23
In this case λ = 1, θ = 0→in equilibrium (e∗, t∗, c∗b) satisfy:


p0(e∗)[g(t∗)− b(t∗)]− d0(e∗) = 0
p(e∗)[g0(t∗)− b0(t∗)] + b0(t∗)− 1 = 0
p(e∗)[g(t∗)− b(t∗)] + c∗b − d(e∗) = ui
That is, (e∗, t∗) are at first best. This is an equilibrium as long as the LL does not bind, that is for
w + ui ≥ s+ p(e∗)[g(t∗)− b(t∗)]− d(e∗)
CASE 2. Both LL and IR bind.
In this case 0 < λ < 1, 0 < θ < 1→in equilibrium (eˆ, tˆ, cˆb) satisfy:



p(eˆ)q(eˆ)− d(eˆ) = ui +w− s
p(eˆ)[g0(tˆ)− b0(tˆ)] + b0(tˆ)− 1 = 0
cˆb = s−w
CASE 3. LL binds, IR does not.
In this case λ = 0, θ = 1→in equilibrium (e˜, t˜, c˜b) satisfy:


p0(e˜)[g(t˜)− b(t˜)]− d0(e˜)− p(e˜)q0(e˜) = 0
p(e˜)[g0(t˜)− b0(t˜)] + b0(t˜)− 1 = 0
c˜b = s−w
The solution is feasible as long as the IR does not bind, that is for w + ui ≤ s+ p(e˜)q(e˜)− d0(e˜)
Summing up, the solution depends on w + u as follows:
w + ui ≥ s+ p(e∗)[g(t∗)− b(t∗)]− d(e∗) e∗, t∗ case 1
s+ p(e˜)q(e˜)− d0(e˜) < w + ui < s+ p(e∗)[g(t∗)− b(t∗)]− d(e∗) eˆ, tˆ case 2
w + ui ≤ s+ p(e˜)q(e˜)− d0(e˜) e˜, t˜ case 3
Proof of Result 1.
First note that for any u, dedw ≥ 0. To see this note that λ
∗ = 1 > λˆ > λ˜ = 0 . From (4) it follows
that e∗ > eˆ > e˜. Also de
∗
dw =
de˜
dw = 0 while
deˆ
dw =
1
pq0 > 0. Taking the total diﬀerential of the FOCt we see
that dtde = −
p0[g0(t)−b0(t)]
p[g00−b00]+b00 > 0 since [g
0 (t)− b0 (t)] > 0 and the denominator is <0 from the second order
conditions for a maximum.
Proof of Result 2.
Recall that when the farmer owns the land his reservation utility is larger or equal than the reservation
utility of the tenant (u1 ≥ u2,), because if an agreement is not reached the farmer can cultivate the land
based on his own resources while the tenant cannot. Note that in case 2 (i.e. when both IR and LL bind), the
equilibrium level of eﬀort is given by p(eˆ)q(eˆ) − d(eˆ) = ui + w − s which implies that deˆdu =
1
pq0 > 0.
Taking the total diﬀerential of FOCt we see that
dt
de = −
p0[g0(t)−b0(t)]
p[g00−b00]+b00 > 0 since [g
0 (t)− b0 (t)] > 0 and the
denominator is <0 from the second order conditions for a maximum.
Proof of Result 3.
Denote by u1 the reservation utility of the farmer when he owns the land. u1 = max{u2, Π(w)} where
u2 is the reservation utility of the tenant and Π(w) are cultivation profits when the farmer does not borrow.
Note that as long as w > s+ t∗− b(t∗) the farmer does not need to borrow and chooses the first best level of
(e, t). Note also that s+ t∗−b(t∗) < s+p(e∗)[g(t∗)−b(t∗)]−d(e∗)−u2 since, by definition, cultivation
at first best is better than the outside option (i.e. p(e∗)[g(t∗)− b(t∗)] + b(t∗)− t∗ − d(e∗) > u2). Thus
when farmers are rich, that is for w > s + p(e∗)[g(t∗) − b(t∗)] − d(e∗) − u2, first best can be achieved
regardless of the distribution of property rights.
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When w < s− b(t∗) and the farmer does not borrow he can invest at most t¯ = w + b(t¯)− s.
Then dΠdw =
dΠ
de
de
dw +
dΠ
dt
dt
dw . Using the envelope theorem the first term equals zero while the second is
p(e¯)[g0(t¯) − b0(t¯)] + b0(t¯) − 1 < 0 since t¯ < t∗. Then either Π(w) > u2 for any w or there is a w0
s.t. for w < w0 Π(w) < u2. In the second case for any w < w0 the solution is the same regardless of
the distribution of property rights. If Π(w) > u2 for any w, on the other hand, there will be a w00 s.t. for
w < w00, Π(w) + w < s+ p(e˜)q(e˜)− d0(e˜), which implies that regardless of the distribution of property
rights the solution will be (e˜, t˜) and, as shown above, de˜du = 0. It follows that property rights matter only for
intermediate wealth levels.
6.3 Non-contingent contracts model
As above, I assume that L has full bargaining power and that he pays for t. The problem then is:
max
cg,cb,t
{p(e)(g(t)− cg) + (1− p(e))(b(t)− cb)− t}
s.t.
p0(e)[cg − cb]− d0(e) = 0 (IC)
p(e)cg + (1− p(e))cb − d(e) ≥ u (IR)
cg = cb (NCL)



cg = g(t)−R
cb = b(t)−R
R−w ≤ b(t)
(NCF )
Where NCL rules out output contingent payments when L owns the land and NCF rules out output
contingent payments when F owns the land. The latter constraint imposes that the farmer repays a fixed
amount, i.e. regardless of the state of the world, and that the repayment minus the cash advance he can oﬀer
on t. That is, the wealthier the farmer, the less he needs to borrow.
CASE 1 L owns the land.
When L owns the land the IC becomes −d0(e) = 0, implying that F will choose the minimum level of
eﬀort, implying that p (e
¯
)→ 0.
The lagrangian of the problem is then:
max
cb,t
L = (b(t)− cb)− t+ λ(cb − d(e¯ )− u)
The Focs are:
b0(t)− 1 = 0 (10)
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−1 + λ = 0 (11)
→in equilibrium (t, cb) satisfy:
½
b0(t)− 1 = 0
cb − d(e¯ )− u = 0
CASE 2 F owns the land.
When the farmer owns the land and w > t∗, the farmer chooses first best (e∗, t∗) and does not need to
borrow. If, on the other hand, w < t∗ the farmer can ask for a loan. In this case, the lagrangian of the problem
is:
max
R,t
L = R− t+ λ [S(t) + t−R− S(w)] +θ[b(t) +w −R]
where S(t) = p(e(t))[g(t) − b(t)] + b(t) −d(e(t)) − t denotes total surplus evaluated at t and e(t)
satisfies the IC : p0(e)[g(t) − b(t)] − d0(e) = 0. The outside option of the farmer is equal to S(w) =
p(e(w))[g(w) − b(w)] + b(w) − w − d(e(w)),that is the utility the farmer would get if he were to can
cultivate the land based on his own financial resources w. Note that dSdw = p[g
0(w)−b0(w)]+ b0(w)−1 > 0
since w < t∗.
The first order conditions are:
1− λ− θ = 0 (12)
−1 + λS0 + λ+ θb0 = 0 (13)
There are three cases:
Case 2.1 NC does not bind, IR does.
In this case λ = 1, θ = 0→ in equilibrium, R∗ and t∗ satisfy:½
S0(t∗) = 0
S(t∗) + t∗ −R∗ − S(w) = 0
That is, first best can be achieved and the lender extracts all the additional surplus, i.e. R∗ − t∗ =
S(t∗)− S(w). This is an equilibrium as long as t∗ −w ≤ b(t∗)− (S(t∗) + S(w)), i.e. as long as the loan
required to finance first best t is not too large.
Case 2.2 Both NC and IR bind.
In this case 0 < λ < 1, 0 < θ < 1→ in equilibrium, Rˆ and tˆ satisfy:½
b(tˆ) +w − Rˆ = 0
S(tˆ) + tˆ− Rˆ− S(w) = 0
Case 2.3 NC does not bind, IR does.
In this case λ = 0, θ = 1→ in equilibrium, R˜ and t˜ satisfy:½
b0(t˜) = 1
b(t˜) +w − R˜ = 0
This is an equilibrium as long as t˜−w ≥ b(t˜)− (S(t˜) + S(w)).
Proof of Result 4:
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From the solution of Case 2 above, it can be seen that t∗ is an equilibrium if and only if t∗ − w ≤
b(t∗)− (S(t∗) + S(w)), i.e. as long as the loan required to finance first best t is not too large. Next, it can
be easily shown that t∗ > tˆ > t˜. Substituting the expression for S in the Foc for t:
p(g0(t∗)− b0(t∗)) + b0(t∗) = 1
λp(g0(tˆ)− b0(tˆ)) + b0(tˆ) = 1
b0(t˜) = 1
The results follows from the fact that λ > 0 and that p(g0(t)− b0(t)) > 0. Finally, note that dt∗dw = 0,
dt˜
dw = 0 and
dtˆ
dw =
1+S0(w)
1+S0(tˆ)−b0(tˆ) > 0.
Proof of Result 5.
From the analysis of Case 1, the Foc for t when L owns the land is b0(t) = 1,while at first best p(g0(t∗)−
b0(t∗))+b0(t∗) = 1. The result follows from the fact that e and t are complements, i.e. p(g0(t)−b0(t)) > 0.
Proof of Result 6.
Comparing Cases 1 and 2, we see that t is the same (i.e. t˜:b0(t˜) = 1) when the farmer who
owns the land is poor enough, i.e. w + S(w) ≤ t˜ − b(t˜) + S(t˜). Result 4 shows that dtFdw ≥ 0 while
dtL
dw = 0→
d(tF−tL)
dw ≥ 0.
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Figure 1. Technique Choice under Limited Liability 
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Figure 2. Technique Choice under Imperfect Commitment 
L owns
F owns 
Table 1.1 Variables Means and Standard Deviations
entire sample owners tenants
mean equality 
test-Pvalue
owner-cum-
tenant
crop mix .56 .62 .47 .00
(.49) (.02) (.02)
mainmix .08 .12 .03 .00
(.28) (.01) (.007)
farmer owns plot .59
(.49)
28.3 39.6 11.6 .00 26.1
(66.5) (81.1) (27.8) (42)
12.5 19.2 1.7 .00 10.1
(49.1) (61.5) (14.1) (27.6)
social capital .47 .50 .42 .03 .59
(.76) (.78) (.73) (.72)
famer's age 46.2 48.5 42.7 .00 47.4
(15.8) (15.5) (15.5) (15.7)
farmer's sex 1.11 1.12 1,11 .55 1.05
(.32) (.32) (.31) (.23)
farmer's education .46 .46 .45 .75 .37
(.49) (.49) (.49) (.48)
plot size (manzanas) 26.15 39.1 7.02 .00
(72.7) (89.9) (23.2)
town size (1000 pers) 37.8 36.8 39.3 .44 42.5
(59.1) (58.3) (60.3) (37.2)
1.86 1.88 1.82 .25 1.88
(1.00) (1.02) (.97) (.92)
11.4 15.2 6.07 .00
(10.3) (10.7) (6.54)
2.2
(2.8)
Table 1.2: Main Crops
% of farmers growing:
entire sample owners tenants proportion 
equality test-
Pvalue
corn 77 78 76 .25
beans 59 60 57 .31
cassave 16 18 13 .03
millet 15 14 16 .23
citrus 37 39 32 .00
banana 17 20 14 .00
coffee 9 13 3 .00
mango 24 26 20 .00
contract length
farmer's wealth 
livestock value 
distance to market (hrs)
years farming plot
Variables Definition
crop mix: dummy variable,=1 if the farmer grows a mix of trees (coffee, citrus, mangoes or bananas) and annual 
crops;
mainmix: dummy variable,=1 if trees are a main crop;
wealth: (value of house+durables+business assets+livestock + farm assets) in thousands of cordobas
education: dummy variable, =1 if the farmer has had some formal education; social capital: number of groups the 
HH belongs to;  plot size: 1 manzana=0.69 hectares;  distance to market: distance from farm to market-- village 
average.
Table 2: Land Distribution and Crop Mix: Basic Specification.
 P-values in parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cross-section household fixed effects
cross section 
with village 
fixed effects
cross-section 
with mainmix 
on LHS
farmer owns plot 0.13 0.18 .08 .09
(.00) (.00) (.01) (.00)
farmer's wealth*10-6 .81 .77 1.3
(.08) (.06) (.02)
livestock value*10-6 -.63 -.43 -1.4
(.34) (.45) (.03)
social capital .06 .04 .01
(.00) (.04) (.44)
famer's age .001 .001 .00
(.29) (.21) (.50)
farmer's sex -.05 -.02 -.00
(.15) (.57) (.92)
farmer's education .02 -.00 .03
(.55) (.90) (.03)
plot size*10-2 -.04 -0.06 -.02 -.00
(.11) (.59) (.27) (.62)
village size .41 .26
(.01) (.07)
distance to market -.06 -.03
(.00) (.11)
town fixed effects yes no no yes
village fixed effects no no yes no
hh fixed effects no yes no no
Nobs 1172 167 1304 1173
R-squared .10 0.08 .23 .13
 
Table 3: Land Distribution and Crop Mix, by Wealth Quintiles
 Dependent Variable is Crop Mix. P-values in parenthesis.
1st  2nd 3rd 4th 5th
-.01 .12 .16 .17 .08
(.91) (.10) (.04) (.02) (.90)
coefficient on land ownership 
variable
Dependent Variable are crop mix=1 if farmer grows a mix of annual and tree crops (columns 1-3); 
mainmix=1 if tree is a main crop (column 4).  P-values are based on robust standard errors -
Huber/White/sandwich estimator- in columns 2 and 4, also controlling for clustering at the village 
level in columns 1 and 3.
dependent variable is crop mix, other regressors are wealth, livestock value, farmer's age, sex and education, village size, 
distance to market and province dummies as above.
 P-values are based on robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) controlling for clustering at the village level 
Table 4: Wealth and Crop Mix, by Ownership Mode
 Dependent Variable is Crop Mix. P-values in parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 full sample  owners only tenants only  owners only tenants only
farmer owns plot .11 - - - -
(.01)
farmer's wealth*10-6 -.21 1.2 .06 1.2 1.3
(.74) (.00) (.95) (.00) (.18)
farmer owns*wealth 1.4
(.03)
livestock value*10-6 -.96 -1.0 -1.6 -1.0 -6.9
(.08) (.10) (.20) (.09) (.27)
social capital .05 .05 .06 .05 .05
(.00) (.05) (.01) (.11) (.13)
famer's age .00 .00 .00 -.00 .00
(.28) (.55) (.36) (.60) (.89)
farmer's sex -.05 -.06 -.00 -.05 .01
(.16) (.20) (.97) (.37) (.91)
farmer's education .02 .05 -.02 .06 -.05
(.54) (.17) (.63) (.09) (.31)
plot size*10-2 -.04 -.03 -.00 -.04 -.01
(.10) (.18) (.14) (.07) (.11)
village size .40 .59 .15 .68 .28
(.01) (.00) (.52) (.00) (.20)
distance to market -.05 -.03 -.09 -.03 -.09
(.00) (.08) (.00) (.08) (.01)
-.02
(.71)
.02 .27
(.57) (.00)
length of contract .03
(.00)
years farming plot .005 -.00
(.00) (.39)
farmer has title .01
(.78)
town fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Nobs 1172 717 455 682 392
R-squared .10 .11 .09 .13 .16
landlord belongs to 
the same family
farmer receives 
technical assistance
P-values are based on robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) controlling for clustering at the 
village level .
Table 5: Length of Tenancy Contracts
1 year 58.0
2 years 21.6
3 years 8.1
4 years 3.3
5 years 2.7
more than 5 6.2
Table 6: Farmers' Credit
yes: 19% 22.4
no:81% 33.8
24.9
18.8
Table 7: Different Measures of Wealth
 Dependent Variable is Crop Mix. P-values in parenthesis.
.13 .13 .13 .13
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
.14 .81 .82 4.4
(.05) (.08) (.08) (.11)
no need
wanted to, but too expensive
wanted to, but I knew I would 
not get it
no supply of loans in the 
community
why didn't 
you ask for a 
loan?
did you ask for a loan 
or advance 
purchase?
coefficient on land 
ownership variable
coefficient on wealth 
variable
wealth=total 
value of assets
wealth=total 
value of assets-
land-farm 
assets
wealth= value 
of durables
wealth=total 
value of assets-
land.
too expensive includes 
the following: (I) interest 
rate too high; (ii) too 
costly; (iii) afraid of 
losing collateral.
Would not get it 
includes: (I) has no 
collateral, (ii) has a large 
debt overhang, (iii) 
income stream is too 
variable.
P-values are based on robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich estimator) controlling for clustering at the village level. 
Other regressors are wealth, livestock value, farmer's age, sex and education, village size, distance to market and province 
dummies as above.
Table 8: IV Estimates
farmer owns plot .004 .10
(.00) (.01)
farmer's wealth*10-6 5.4
(.05)
livestock value*10-6 1.1 -5.7
(.00) (.06)
social capital .001 .05
(.04) (.01)
famer's age .0003 -.00
(.00) (.89)
farmer's sex -.001 -.03
(.47) (.30)
farmer's education .006 -.02
(.00) (.64)
plot size*10-2 .00004 -.01
(.07) (.04)
village size -.01 .37
(.04) (.02)
distance to market -1.6 -.04
(.05) (.08)
.01
(.05)
.00
(.90)
.001
(.06)
-0.17
(.01)
.07
(.09)
.19
(.02)
.02
(.12)
-.01
(.04)
town fixed effects yes yes
Instruments=0 -P-
value .00
.73
.99
Nobs 1148 1148
R-squared .77 .03
Hausman Test-P-value
village median land 
value
%of secondary 
school graduates
2nd stage--LHS 
variable is crop 
mix
1st stage--LHS 
variable is 
wealth*10-6
%of people in houses 
with direct water 
supply
religious 
fractionalisation
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions- 
P-value
wife's mother 
education
literacy rate
%of primary school 
graduates
wife's father 
education
Variables Definition:
wife's parents education =1 if they 
have some formal education. 
religious fractionalisation=1 if less 
than 70% of the population belongs 
to the main religion.
P-values are based on robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich 
estimator) controlling for clustering at the village level.
TABLE A1 SOIL AND CLIMATE REQUIREMENTS
Temperature Light Day Length Texture Depth Drainage Ph. Fertility
banana 12-42 1-4 N M/W/O D/M W 4-8.4 H/M
beans 7-32 1-3 S/N M/W/O M/S W 4-9 M/L
cassava 10-35 1-3 S/N L/M/W/O M W/E 4-9 M/L
citrus 13-42 1-2 S/N L/M/W D/M W/E 4-8 M/L
coffee arabica 10-34 1-4 S/N L/M/O D/M W 4.3-8.4 H/M
coffee robusta 12-36 1-4 S/N M/H/W M/S W/I 4-8 H/M/L
maize 10-47 1-2 S/N M/W/O M/S W/E 4.5-8.5 H/M/L
mango 8-48 1-3 S/N L/M/W D/M W/E 4.3-8.5 M/L
millet 15-34 1-2 S/N M/W M/S W/E 5.2-8.2 M/L
plantain 16-38 1-4 N L/M/W D/M W 4.5-7.5 H/M
rice 16-38 1-3 S W M/S W/I 3.5-9 M/L
Source: FAO, Ecocrop 1, Land and Water Digital Media Series.
Notes:1. Temperature in Celsius; 2.Light ranges from 1=very bright to 5=heavy shade; 3. Day Length: N=12hrs, S<12hrs; 4. Texture:
W=wide range of soil texture, L=light, M=medium, H=heavy, O=high organic content; 5.Depth: D>150cm, S<50cm,
50cm<M<150cm;6.Drainage: W=well, E=excessive, I=incomplete; 7.Fertility: H=high, M=medium, L=low.
